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China pe rspect i ves
B
eginning in the 1980s, a new trend emerged in mainland China for
the revival of traditional studies and culture, in particular a revival of
Confucianism, giving rise to related activity such as the establish-
ment of “national studies institutes” at universities and teaching children
to read the classics. This intellectual trend and related activities are re-
ferred to as the “national studies craze.” This article will use a brief descrip-
tion of the phenomena as a foundation for presenting and critiquing the
controversies that surround them, and offering some of my own reflec-
tions, namely, using the angle of “universality” to view the national studies
craze and analytically assess its rationality.
The phenomena of the “national studies craze”
How to treat “national studies,” i.e., the issue of China’s traditional cul-
ture, has constituted a focus of long-term and intense controversy in
China’s modern and contemporary times, a debate that has risen and
fallen in line with China’s political and economic terrain. Since the May
Fourth Movement, it could be said that progressive and innovative intel-
lectuals, especially the leading thinkers in the New Culture Movement
such as Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀), Hu Shi (胡適), and Lu Xun (魯迅), maintained
a critical attitude toward traditional thought and culture: “Down with offi-
cial Confucianism!” was the slogan that emblemised this intellectual trend.
By the time Mao Zedong (毛澤東) launched and led the Cultural Revolu-
tion, traditional Confucian thought was being labelled as feudalistic, con-
servative thought, an impediment that Mao had to demolish in order to
push forward his own revolutionary thought and line, and it was subjected
to organised, widespread criticism throughout the country.
With the end of the Cultural Revolution, the new national policy of reform
and opening implemented by China from the end of 1979 onward, achieved
impressive economic development, and national strength and its attendant
national status were rapidly enhanced. In lockstep with this process, the
cultural and social psychology of the Chinese public and government also
underwent change. The road to China’s modernisation was originally to suc-
ceed through “thought liberation movements,” including the method of
criticising traditional feudal thought, systems, and behaviour to clear away
mental impediments, and through learning from the modernisation experi-
ence of foreign developed countries (such as market economy, etc.), and in-
tegrating it with China’s realities in practical application. For this reason, the
conflict between the traditional and the modern became especially pro-
nounced during China’s modernisation process. China was not like Western
countries, which built on an existing foundation rooted in Christianity and
ancient Greek culture to rejuvenate the values of their own intellectual cir-
cles through a process of Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment,
and thereby provided the intellectual and cultural conditions required for
their shift toward modern society. Rather, China’s modernisation movement
was pushed from behind and outside (incited and urged on by external fac-
tors). Whether it was the Soviet model adopted during the Mao era, or the
Western market economy model from which the Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平)
era drew its lessons, China’s modernisation process has always been
launched and carried out under a series of ideological theories and social
practices furnished by the outside world, rather than resulting from the self-
renewal of its own culture. For this reason, one of the resulting conflicts is
that in this process of modernisation, China’s traditional culture has been
marginalised or even regarded as an obstacle that must be surmounted.
Under these circumstances, a certain degree of antagonism and divergence
has formed between traditional culture and modernisation, and between
national character and modernity. In terms of the national psyche, this
state of affairs is inevitably hard to accept, and particularly for people with
nationalist sentiments, it increases the likelihood of antagonism toward
Western culture and toward modernisation in general. This constitutes a
background and cause for conflict in the “national studies craze.”
It was noted above that the push of the modernisation process brings an
increase in national strength and changes to the cultural and social psy-
chology of the people and the government. One fundamental aspect of
this change is for an enhanced national self-confidence to be accompanied
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by a heightened reassessment of traditional culture. Motivations and
knowledge vary greatly, however, between ordinary citizens and officials
and between people of different classes. What the government needs is the
people’s identification with their ethnic identity, their country, and their
government; it needs the enhancement of the country’s cultural “soft
power” in international competition. In terms of the people, individuals
with intense national sentiment are unhappy with the pervasive fashion
for Western discourse, and hope for a “revitalisation of national studies” as
a means of resisting West-centrism; scholars engaged in traditional Chi-
nese studies hope to enhance the status of national studies for profes-
sional reasons; and members of the general public derive a cultural pleas-
ure from listening to well-versed lectures on the Confucian Analects or on
classic tales like the Legend of the Three Kingdoms. The revival of national
studies has thus become the locus for a variety of different emotions and
interests. The gradual accumulation of these factors has led to the emer-
gence of the current “national studies craze.”
The national studies craze has built up gradually over time. Let us here
list some emblematic incidents. In terms of official action, in September
1984, the CCP Central Committee secretariat resolved to establish a gov-
ernment-funded “China Confucian Foundation,” with then-State Council
member Gu Mu (穀牧) serving as honorary president and Kuang Yaming 
(匡亞明) (1) as president. This marked a major shift in the attitude of China’s
ruling Party and government toward Confucius. In October 1994, the Inter-
national Confucius Federation was established, with Gu Mu serving as pres-
ident, and with the stated aim of “carrying on the cream of Confucianism
and developing the spirit of Confucianism.” At the same time, the govern-
ment was organising or supporting various ceremonies honouring Confu-
cius in the sage’s native Qufu (曲阜) and other localities. In September
2005, CCTV enhanced the atmosphere by carrying live broadcasts of Con-
fucius ceremonies at temples in Qufu and Shanghai, and in other localities
such as Quzhou (衢州), Zhejiang Province; Jianshui (建水), Yunnan Province;
and Wuwei (武威), Gansu Province.
In terms of popular action, in November 1986, “Modern Neo-Confucian
Studies” was established as a key topic for discussion in the seventh five-year
plan of the National Social Sciences Foundation of China, and at the begin-
ning of 1992 it was also listed among the key topics in the eighth five-year
plan. This resulted in the works of some Hong Kong and Taiwan Neo-Confu-
cianists being recommended and published on the mainland – for example,
the 14-volume series Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, edited
by Fang Keli, (2) which included representative works by notables Xiong Shili 
(熊十力), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟), Ma Yifu (馬一浮), Carsun Chang (張君勱),
Thome H. Fang (方東美), Feng Yu-Lan (馮友蘭), He Lin (賀麟), Tang Junyi 
(唐君毅), Mou Zongshan (牟宗三), Xu Fuguan (徐複觀), Tu Weiming (杜維明),
Shu-hsien Liu (劉述先), Yu Ying-shih (余英時), and Zhongying Cheng (成中英).
The national studies craze has continued to heat up in the twenty-first
century. The year 2004, in particular, saw several incidents relating to Con-
fucianism, including publication of Classics of Chinese Culture for Recita-
tion in Elementary Schools, the convening of the “National Conference for
Exchanging Experience on Children’s Classical Recitation,” and a grandiose
“2004 Cultural Pinnacle Forum” held at the Great Hall of the People, during
the closing ceremony of which was announced a “Cultural Manifesto of
the 甲申, Jiashen Year [2004]” initiated by some famous scholars and
signed by 70 participants. That same year saw a symposium marking the
10th anniversary of the publication Yuandao (原道), (3) referred to as “a
banner of Chinese cultural conservatism.” The symposium discussed views
on the future of Confucian culture. That summer, a symposium on the “The
Modern Fate of Confucianism,” lauded as “a summit meeting of cultural
conservatives,” was held in Guiyang. This series of events made 2004 a year
that further stoked the fires of national studies fever.
Beginning in 2005, the establishment of a “national studies institute” at
Renmin (人民) University spread the national studies craze to educational
circles. One after another, Tsinghua (清華) University, Xiamen (廈門) Uni-
versity, Wuhan University, and other tertiary institutions revived or estab-
lished national studies institutes. Several of them even recruited full sets
of national studies undergraduate and graduate students, then applied to
the Ministry of Education to classify national studies as a first-class disci-
pline, of equivalent ranking with disciplines such as philosophy, history,
language, and history.
Yi Zhongtian’s (易中天) “Commentary on the Three Kingdoms” and Yu
Dan’s (于丹) “About The Analects,” aired on CCTV’s “Lecture Room” 
(百家講壇, Baijia Jiangtan) program, became sensations and spread the na-
tional studies craze further into the public sphere. National studies courses
mushroomed throughout the country, and popular books relating to Con-
fucianism and traditional culture became best sellers. The phenomenon of
“children reading classics” also emerged, with some elementary schools
(such as Hangzhou’s Gongchenqiao (拱宸橋) Primary School) having their
students recite from The Analects for 10 minutes every morning, noon, and
evening. (4) Even some prisons (such as Guangdong’s Foshan Prison) tried
implementing national studies education by having prisoners perform
group recitation of the Three-Character Classic and so on. (5) The national
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4. Author’s note (All notes are author’s notes unless otherwise specified): See Ma Junya et al., “Ji Xianlin
Ren Jiyu liqu: ‘Guoxue re’ fuxing haishi xuhuo?” (Ji Xianlin and Ren Jiyu depart: “National studies craze”
as revival or borrowed heat?), 20 July 2009, http://bbs.beijingww.com/thread-17905-1-12.html.
5. See Yang Dazheng et al., “Foshan jianyu yong ‘Guoxue re’” (Foshan Prison engulfed in “national studies
craze”), Zhongguo Ningbowang, 24 November 2009, http://news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2009/
11/24/006335718.shtml.
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studies craze also spread to business management. China’s highest seat of
learning, Peking University, was one of a number of prestigious universities
that seized the opportunity to offer “national studies courses” that charged
tuition as high as tens of thousands of yuan to help entrepreneurs absorb
what was termed the “commercial wisdom” of national studies. In no time,
national studies became a panacea for every conceivable ill.
Controversies and criticism triggered by the
national studies craze
It should have been a matter of course for Chinese to propose studying
and promoting their own traditional culture. Due to the complexity of tra-
ditional culture, however, and for particular historical and practical rea-
sons, as well as some circumstances emerging from the craze itself, the na-
tional studies craze became a controversial issue.
What are “national studies”?
If “national studies” are to be promoted, it is necessary to first establish
clearly what “national studies” include. Chen Duxiu previously raised the point
that we did not really understand what national studies were. He even cate-
gorically asserted, regarding the term “national studies,” that “even if we ex-
amine and revise it for 100 years, we may not succeed in obtaining a clear-cut
definition, because ‘national studies’ has murky origins and is not a proper
term.” (6)One of the critical views at present likewise holds that the concept of
“national studies” is applied ambiguously. I will summarise the current main
uses of the term into several categories:
1) A general reference to China’s intrinsic traditional culture, as opposed to
Western learning and culture. Some scholars formulate it as “a country’s
intrinsic learning.” (7) Others point to specific content, such as the Three
Doctrines and Nine Schools (三教九流), including Confucianism, Buddhism
and Daoism. (8)This is the broadest connotation and is also the most com-
monly used. Some scholars believe it encompasses not only the humani-
ties and social sciences, but also the natural sciences. (9)Yet others put for-
ward the concept of “greater China studies,” which apart from Han Chi-
nese culture includes all ethnic minority cultures that have emerged
within China’s historical borders. (10)
2) Referring to China’s historical learning and culture. As Zhang Dainian 
(張岱年) puts it, “National means this country, national studies means
the learning of this country, namely Chinese learning.” (11)
3) Referring to “study of the Six Arts.” This has been put forward by Ma
Yifu and endorsed by Liu Mengxi (劉夢溪) and other scholars. (12)
The current national studies craze is mainly in the sense of the first cat-
egory, that is, a traditional culture craze. But even “national studies” in this
sense is very ambiguous. If “vigorously promoting national studies” meant
promoting Chinese literature and arts that carry on tradition – such as re-
viving the popularity of listening to stories from The Three Kingdoms, lis-
tening to lectures on the Analects, appreciating traditional drama (such as
Peking Opera), and even reciting passages from the classics – and enjoy-
ment of traditional culture in this sense surged into a fad, it would not
have given rise to any controversy or been fundamentally controversial. In
addition, purely undertaking academic research into national studies, for
instance research in “Dunhuang (敦煌) studies,” would not cause any con-
troversy over “legitimacy.” That is because these are not really part of the
core values of culture, and therefore would not conflict in any way with the
so-called Western values of freedom, democracy, and justice, and conse-
quently would not trigger questions of whether the so-called “subjectivity”
and “consciousness” of Chinese culture, the “self-confidence” of the Chi-
nese, and the actual road of China’s modernisation are a form of “West-
ernisation.” On the contrary, in terms of cultural vehicles such as literature
and art, others hold to the precept that “the more it belongs to the nation-
ality, the more it belongs to the world,” approving of harmonisation be-
tween national character and global character and the implied harmonisa-
tion between Chinese culture and Western culture.
What has actually raised controversy in the national studies craze, and
genuinely constitutes a problem, is the question of traditional cultural val-
ues and their function. In particular, it is the question of the values of what
is generally acknowledged as the core of traditional culture, Confucianism,
and its role in the process of China’s modernisation, as well as the problem
of Confucian fundamentalism appearing in extremist form to oppose
Western culture. In the past, Guo Moruo (郭沫若) and Shen Yanbing 
(沈雁冰), (13) while endorsing a reorganisation of China’s national heritage,
worried that this would easily play into the hands of the restoration fac-
tion and “facilitate counterattacks by the forces of old society.” (14) These
concerns were not, in fact, unreasonable.
The value and function of national studies
In modern and contemporary history, thinking people’s affirmation of the
value of national studies has primarily focused on its role in national iden-
tification and in encouraging patriotism. Zhang Taiyan (章太炎) (15) proposed
this as the objective of national studies during the late Qing and around the
time of the 1911 Revolution, in a context that regarded the Manchu rulers
as an “alien race.” He wrote, “Why promote national essence? It is not so
that people will respect Confucianism, but only so they will cherish the his-
tory of our Han race.” For this reason he put forward “using the national
essence to stir racial sensibilities and enhance patriotic fervour.” (16) Zhang
Taiyan’s use of the term “patriotic” here has the connotation of resisting not
only the “alien” rule of the Qing dynasty, but also “Europeanisation.”
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6. Ren Jianshu et al. (ed.), Chen Duxiu zhuzuo xuan (Selected works of Chen Duxiu), vol. 2, Shanghai ren-
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11. Zhang Dainian, “Guoxe yu shidai” (National studies and the times), Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan yan-
jiushengyuan xuebao, no. 5, 1995, p. 1. TN: Zhang Dainian is professor emeritus of philosophy at Peking
University. 
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15. TN: Born Zhang Binglin (章炳麟, 1868-1936), a Chinese philologist, textual critic and anti-Manchu rev-
olutionary.
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Where, then, is the value of national studies in contemporary society?
Scholars encouraging the promotion of Confucianism enumerate the fol-
lowing main values for which Confucianism can serve as a modern intel-
lectual resource: the view of man at harmony with and as an integral part
of nature; the moral law of “not doing unto others what you would not
have done unto yourself”; and the emphasis on harmony as a principle of
social conduct. For example, Peking University professor Tang Yijie’s essays
propose that in regard to the three major problems existing in human so-
ciety – that is, the relationship between man and nature, the relation be-
tween individuals, and the relationship between an individual’s body and
mind – Confucianism’s three philosophical propositions of “unity of man
with nature (or Heaven),” “unity of self with others,” and “unity of body
and mind” offer a valuable train of thought and an intellectual resource of
particular importance. The leading exponent of Neo-Confucianism over-
seas, Tu Weiming, has put forward this question for consideration: If the
world required reorganisation, could Confucianism serve as “a new value”
and “offer some spiritual resources” to replace the ultra-competitive social
Darwinism and the law-of-the-jungle hegemony represented by the West?
In mainland China, a relatively common viewpoint at present is that
under the current conditions of China’s gradual rise in strength and pros-
perity, reviving national studies facilitates “raising cultural consciousness,
recovering cultural self-confidence, achieving cultural identification, and
enhancing the cohesive force of nationalism,” which in turn facilitates
“raising ethical standards among the Chinese, promoting their cultural ac-
complishments, and building a harmonious society, which will ultimately
facilitate “enhancing China’s cultural competitiveness and promoting its
international influence.” (17)
What is regrettable is that among the values and relevance the afore-
mentioned scholars suggest that Confucianism can offer to contemporary
society, we see nothing that today’s Chinese society urgently needs – that
is, the values needed to build a modern society, such as human rights,
democracy, and justice. To borrow current political terminology, the mod-
ern conceptual resources of Confucianism listed above do not touch on
humanity’s “core values”; or in other words, in terms of human existence
and its attendant social laws and institutions, the values Confucianism can
offer the present age are not the most central or fundamental. Freedom,
justice, democracy, and rule of law are the most central values, and they
are the prerequisite conditions for the establishment of a modern society.
As for the relationship between man and nature, between individuals, and
between body and spirit, it is only under an optimal system with democ-
racy and rule of law, and in which an individual’s rights are fully safe-
guarded, that these can be brought to full fruition. Unfortunately, these
core values do not appear among the values of traditional culture that oth-
ers have mentioned.
For this reason, some opposing voices have emerged in the midst of the
national studies craze. Regarding the status of national studies in contem-
porary China, Nankai (南開) University Professor Liu Zehua (劉澤華) and
others have taken the view that the process of China’s modernisation has
put national studies in a “helpless and marginalised” position, and that this
in fact demonstrates “the progress of history” and the immutable “choice
of history” that cannot be diverted by subjective will. (18) Professor Chen
Lemin (陳樂民) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has unequivo-
cally opposed raising up national studies (or “old studies”) in a time of re-
form and opening. He categorically asserts that so-called “national stud-
ies” has gone in and out of vogue from the late Qing to the present, and
that it “early on ran out of steam” and has not been able to accomplish
anything of significance. He quotes Wen Yiduo (聞一多) (19) as saying, “After
living among piles of musty old books and papers for more than 10 years,
I have gained a firm grasp of the ills of our people and this culture, and I
dare to write a prescription.” Chen Lemin believes that the prescription re-
ferred to here was “the ideal of democracy and freedom.” He counters with
the question of whether “old studies” or “national studies” could accom-
plish this task. If not, then it was simply preposterous, in this time of re-
form and opening, to wheel out national studies that represent a retreat
back in time. In a similar vein, some scholars hold that Confucian doctrine
was negated back during the May Fourth movement, and that to restore it
now to such high esteem is historical reversionism, etc., etc.
Some commentators, while not denying the modern relevance of na-
tional studies, point out the limitations of this relevance, namely, that it
can play only a sideline role in China’s modernisation. For example, the di-
rector of Peking University’s Chinese Studies Institute, Yuan Xingpei 
(袁行霈), points out, “What will genuinely save China and guide China to-
ward modernisation is not national studies,” although he believes that in
China’s progress toward modernisation, national studies can serve a “pro-
motional function.” (20) This implies that in terms of China’s modernisation,
national studies serves only a supplementary function.
Is the national studies craze “artificial heat”?
Commercial speculation and other such activities accompanying the na-
tional studies craze are another focus of criticism in the media. Because
some prominent universities have used “national studies” as an excuse to
offer high-tuition commercial “national studies” courses, and equally nu-
merous and profitable children’s “national studies classes” have been set
up throughout the country, these methods using national studies for the
pursuit of profit have aroused antipathy in society, incurring more than a
little criticism that this is a vulgar commercial activity, or that the national
studies fever is a form of “artificial heat” (21) that can only be considered
part of a popular cultural propagation campaign that has not attained any
meaningful academic level.
For example, some articles have depicted the phenomenon in a critical
way: “In the current market economy environment, all kinds of commercial
powers are engaging in speculative ‘national studies’ activities that change
its character. Dedication to work and a sense of responsibility have paled,
and manipulation and engineering and other such methods have been fully
utilised, with market value and a consciousness of fame and wealth com-
ing to the forefront and becoming the objective. So ‘national studies’ spec-
ulation is essentially a kind of commercial activity rather than a ‘national
studies’ activity. It turns out that profound, uplifting, remote, mysterious
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16. Tang Zhijun (ed.), Zhang Dayan zhenglun xuanji (Selected political commentaries of Zhang Dayan), 
vol. 1, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1977, p. 272.
17. Ji Baocheng, “Guoxue hewei” (What is national studies), Guangming Daily, 21 July 2008, quoted in
Ruxue yaobao, no. 124, p. 10.
18. Liu Zehua et al., “Ba guoxue liewei yiji xueke butuo” (Inappropriate to make national studies a first-
class discipline), Zhongguo shehui kexuebao, 11 February 2010, quoted in Ruxue youbao, no. 122, 
p. 21.
19. TN: Wen Yiduo (1899-1946) was a leading poet of the 1920s killed by KMT right-wingers for criticising
the government.
20. Yuan Xingpei, “Guoxue de dangdai xingtai yu dangdai yiyi” (The modern form and significance of na-
tional studies), in Makesizhuyi yanjiu, no. 10, 2008, pp. 71-72.
21. TN: The term in traditional Chinese medicine for a condition of “yin deficiency” has the alternative
meaning of relying on someone else’s power or influence.
Chen Jiaming – The National Studies Craze
national studies and traditional cultural classics can be made as ‘theatri-
cal,’ entertaining, and comical as Qing palace dramas (22)... Since starting
‘national studies courses’ in Shanghai geared toward entrepreneurs, Fudan
and Tsinghua [universities] are scrambling for students. Tsinghua’s ‘national
studies course’ charges tuition of 26,000 yuan, while Fudan charges 38,000
yuan per year. Fudan University’s College of Management has also started
an ‘Outstanding Women’s Curriculum,’ which claims to use ‘national stud-
ies’ essentials to help imbue successful women with the personal charm of
Oriental women.... This kind of entrepreneur-oriented ‘national studies
course’ – costly, removed from the ordinary people, and removed from
mass education – has become ‘national studies’ for dilettantes.” (23)
Some writers sharply criticise this kind of national studies speculation for
making national studies into the ultimate “luxury item” and target of ex-
travagant spending. It has become “Monk Tang’s flesh,” (24) with everyone
wanting a bite. The national studies craze has become an amusement, and
enhancing national studies has become a front for the ultimate objective
of pursuing economic profit. (25)
Some media reports have employed a sarcastic tone in their depictions
of children reading Confucian classics: 
“The Standards for Students / were taught by the sages / First is fil-
ial and fraternal duty / next is to be careful and trustworthy....” A
dozen children dressed in traditional Chinese garb sit ramrod
straight, their eyes fixed forward, and with bobbing heads loudly ac-
company their teacher reciting the Standards for Students. A por-
trait of Confucius hangs on the teacher’s wall, and ancient tunes
flow gently from a tape-recorder in the corner. This is a typical
classroom in many of today’s ”national studies instruction halls.” (26)
The method of “children reading classics” also emerged after the 1911
Revolution. For example, Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), who planned to restore the
monarchy, at one point ordered the resumption of reading the classics in
primary and secondary schools. During the Japanese puppet regime, pri-
mary and secondary school students were required to read the Classic of
Filial Piety, The Analects, Mencius, the Book of Rites and other classics
every week. Zhu Ziqing (朱自清) (27) said of this, “Although there have been
one or two campaigns to have primary and secondary students read the
classics since the Republican era, they were unsuccessful; people consid-
ered them turning back the wheels of history.” (28) History often produces
astonishing resemblances. Some people will inevitably ask whether current
activities are likewise “turning back the wheels of history.”
Regarding the phenomenon of young children reading classics, Sun Yat-
sen University professor Yuan Weishi (袁偉時) attacked it without even a
veneer of courtesy: “If the classics-reading movement were strictly volun-
tary, it would give little cause for criticism. But they want to take the old
road of the warlords of the early twentieth century, forcing children to read
the classics, which is extremely foolish and wrong.” (29)
“Confucian fundamentalism” in the national studies
craze
The most extreme thinking in the national studies craze has come from
particular individuals among the “Confucian fundamentalists.” Their lead-
ing exponent, Jiang Qing (蔣慶), (30) renders the following basic judgment of
China’s current reality: China’s political and legal concepts and systems are
becoming progressively Westernised, and China, “in terms of its political
and legal concepts and system, has already become a colony of Western
culture and Western learning.” He even goes so far as to offer as “clear
proof” of this judgment “the widespread faith in freedom and human rights
among the Chinese, and the state’s advocacy of democracy and rule of
law.” (31)
Generally speaking, Chinese regard “freedom and human rights” and
“democracy and rule of law” as positive values – they’re good things. Yet
Jiang Qing offers them as proof that China has become colonised by West-
ern culture. By that logic it could be said that anything from the West is
bad. At this point we are compelled to respond by asking: if “freedom and
human rights” and “democracy and rule of law” must be negated, does that
mean that only their opposite – despotism – can be called a good thing?
Based on the aforementioned judgment that China has already been
colonised by Western culture, Jiang Qing preaches the revival of Confucian-
ism to counter Western culture. He proposes an entire program for reviving
Confucianism and using it to resolve all of China’s problems – political, so-
cial, and in daily life. The main points of this program include:
1) Making Confucianism the state religion and state ideology. China
would implement a political system allying religion (Confucianism)
and state in which the state would take on the responsibility of moral
education.
2) Establishing a system of “Confucian constitutional government” and
making Confucianism the foundation of the state regime’s legitimacy.
3) Re-establishing the imperial civil service examination system and clas-
sical education, with The Four Books and The Five Classics serving as
basic textbooks for primary and secondary school, and with govern-
ment employment requiring passing an exam on The Four Books and
The Five Classics.
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sikao, no. 8, 2007, posted on Xinhua Net, 19 April 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2007-
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25. Li Huahui, “Guoxue re yi xu leng sikao” (National studies craze requires cool reflection), Zhongguo
jiaoyubao, no. 11, 20 March 2007, quoted at Guanggong zaixin, 20 March 2007,
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26. Ma Junya et al., “Ji Xianlin Ren Jiyu liqu…,” op. cit.
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28. Zhu Ziqing, “Jingdian changtan” (Classical platitudes), see San Dashi tan guoxue (Three great scholars
comment on national studies), Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2007, p. 195.
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30. Author of Political Confucianism and operator of a Confucian academy in Guizhou Province, Jiang Qing
argues that Confucianism is more appropriate for contemporary China than Western-style liberal
democracy. See Daniel A. Bell, “China’s Leaders Rediscover Confucianism,” International Herald Tribune,
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by the same author, “A Visit to a Confucian Academy, Dissent Magazine, 22 September 2008,
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=146.
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(Reviving two Confucian traditions – rebuilding “political Confucianism” and “mental Confucianism”),
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These stands by Confucian fundamentalists (原教旨主義者, yuanjiao zhi
zhuyizhe) have met with a largely critical response. China’s ideologically
enlightened citizens are able to discriminate among ideas, and are no
longer as gullible as they once were. Criticisms of Confucian fundamental-
ists posted on the Internet express quite reasonable viewpoints. For exam-
ple, a commentary from Eastern Morning Post (方早報, Dongfang Zaobao)
says that at present “Confucian fundamentalists magnify the virtues of
traditional Chinese culture, then go on to magnify the shortcomings of
Western culture.” (32) Another online essay states: “The movement to op-
pose democratic politics and revive monarchy thoroughly destroys the
credibility of Jiang Qing’s Confucian revival.” (33) These criticisms strike at
the heart of Confucian fundamentalism.
Given that the agenda of Confucian fundamentalism is rooted in the
past, it has inevitably met with criticism from scholars of various schools
of thought. The objections voiced by scholars of the Liberalism school are:
The idea of “Confucianism saving China” is reactionary to modern demo-
cratic government and tramples on the concept of “equality.” Establishing
Confucianism as “state religion” would make China into a Confucian ver-
sion of Iran and constitute “an attempt to turn Confucianism into ideology
in the service of despotism.” Some Liberal scholars offer the further criti-
cism that promoting a political Confucianism – attempting to “use the po-
litical wisdom and guiding principles of Confucianism to transform China’s
political reality and establish in China a political order that gains its legit-
imacy from the Way of Heaven” – essentially opposes the modern demo-
cratic politics of equality of all before the law and universal suffrage, and
insists on an obscurantism that puts “the intelligent over the ignorant” and
“gentlemen over those of low estate” and gives sages the innate power to
instruct the common people while giving ordinary people no power to
utilise rational analysis. “This absurd proposition will only serve as a kiss of
death to carrying on and enhancing traditional thinking and culture.” (34)
Marxist scholars offer the following refutations to Confucian fundamen-
talism: “The fanciful notion of Confucianism saving the world is essentially
self-aggrandisement of one’s moral role.” It is also “using the metaphysics
of the Way of Heaven and principle of nature in the pursuit of kingly poli-
tics, which can only fall back into the trap of feudal autocracy.” “The
world’s salvation lies only in Marxism.” (35)
Even scholars in the Confucian camp oppose the extremist stands taken
by Confucian fundamentalists. For example, a Confucian scholar at Sichuan
University, Huang Yushun (黃玉順), has written that he is “of one voice”
with Confucian fundamentalists in their stands on national culture and op-
posing Westernisation, but that in regards to their “rejection of all so-called
‘Western’ things and rejection of all basic ‘achievements of human civili-
sation,’” including the rejection of developing democracy and science and
even opposition to science, he “begs to differ.” (36)
The national studies craze from the angle of
universality
As conflicts with Western civilisation have emerged in recent times and
centred on the question of where China is going, traditional Chinese cul-
ture’s relationship with modern culture has become a crucial issue vexing
China’s thinkers. On the one hand, the largely Confucian traditional culture
cannot provide values and theories of modernisation such as market eco-
nomics and democratic politics. On the other hand, the concepts and val-
ues that can be learned from the West make some people apprehensive
that China will sink into Westernisation. For that reason, the real quandary
for China’s thinkers has been in finding a way to satisfy both sides by al-
lowing China to implement modernisation like the developed countries of
the West, while at the same time preserving China’s traditional culture.
From the late Qing up until the late twentieth century, controversy over
this point was typically embodied in well-known propositions such as “Chi-
nese for essence and Western for utility” or “Western for essence and Chi-
nese for utility.” The current national studies craze is in fact a specific man-
ifestation of this debate, and is the particular reverberation of that old
question in a new era.
The grounds the current national studies craze puts forward for “vigor-
ously developing national studies” are therefore mainly related to compe-
tition or contention with “Western studies” or Western culture. This can be
divided into two aspects. “Cultural Confucianism” in a general cultural sense
focuses on raising a national cultural consciousness, reviving cultural self-
confidence, bringing about cultural identification, and defending the “sub-
jectivity” of Chinese culture. In terms of the “political Confucianism” of Con-
fucian fundamentalism, the goal of “reviving Confucianism” is to “respond
to the comprehensive challenges posed by Western civilisation” in order to
“rebuild Chinese civilisation,” and to use Confucianism to comprehensively
“resolve China’s political problems, social problems, and problems of the
people’s livelihood.” (37) These two ways of thinking have a common back-
ground and confront a common question: As China rises to the status of a
great nation, what position should traditional culture hold in our people’s
current and subsequent development, and how should the relationship be-
tween national character and modern character be managed?
Since the 1990s, with the growth of China’s economy and general
strength and prosperity, nationalism has leapt to the fore as a major social
trend in China. It is manifested in a variety of forms, sometimes quite fa-
natical. The national studies craze has served to boost nationalism. The
combination of national studies with nationalism is reflected in attempts
to use a nationalism based on Confucian culture as a socially integrated re-
source for China’s modernisation. For example, Shanghai Normal Univer-
sity professor Xiao Gongqin (蕭功秦) calls for a nationalism based on the
mainstream culture of Confucianism to serve as a new ideological resource
for China’s transition. He holds that “Under the new historical conditions,
seeking new resources to legitimise power so as to achieve coalescence
and integration in the process of social transformation is a major problem
that China’s modernisation is currently facing.” (38) In his view, because
Confucianism in the 1990s already had no “anti-modern” qualities, it had
the capacity to provide this kind of ideological resource.
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Chen Jiaming – The National Studies Craze
The nationalism displayed in the cultural sphere against the backdrop of
the national studies craze – “cultural nationalism” – takes the basic stance
that Western civilisation is currently facing an irresolvable spiritual and
cultural crisis, and only Eastern culture can rescue the world from this cri-
sis. For this reason, the twentieth century was the century of Chinese cul-
ture. A prominent Peking University professor, Ji Xianlin (季羨林), is a lead-
ing proponent of this viewpoint. The grounds for his argument are that
every civilisation experiences its periods of rise and fall – or in the words
of the Chinese proverb, the river flows east for 30 years and then west for
30 years, wind and water flowing in alternating directions over time.
Hence, the historical replacement of decadent Western culture with flour-
ishing Eastern culture is at hand. Some scholars dismiss Ji Xianlin’s view-
point as a crude “fengshui ” theory not even worth refuting. One extreme
demand of cultural nationalism is to enshrine Confucianism as state reli-
gion in the Constitution.
For any national group, nationalism has always served a two-fold pur-
pose. On the one hand, it can generate a national and cultural identifica-
tion that enhances social cohesive force and stimulates patriotic fervour.
On the other hand, it can easily be utilised as a behavioural criterion un-
moored from any grounds of scientific principle, inciting blind feelings of
vengeance and parochialism against the Other is one of its manifestations.
However, the social progress brought by reform and opening, the experi-
ence and lessons of history, the enlightenment of thought and culture, and
an increased understanding of the outside world have combined to make
today’s Chinese much more rational. One awakened realisation is of the
danger of getting bogged down in parochial nationalism; it “brings about
an intensely xenophobic mentality, and cannot genuinely and thoroughly
absorb the strong points of other nations’ cultures – in particular absorb
and adapt to modernisation and adapt to the cultural resources required
by modern society.” (39) For that reason, the national studies craze needs to
guard against a tendency toward parochial nationalism. It is the natural
enemy of China’s opening, especially in a situation in which Chinese soci-
ety currently lacks a mechanism of checks and balances.
Another major problem related to the national studies craze is the issue
of the modernity of China. Can reliance on Confucian traditional culture
lead China to achieve modernisation? The only possible answer is no. What
has China relied on to achieve the progress it has made over 30 years of
reform and opening? Clearly it has not relied on the traditional culture of
Confucianism as its ideological resource. Given that Confucianism is a
long-established ancient doctrine and culture, if it were able to push for-
ward the process of China’s modernisation, it would have done so long ago,
and modern China would not have been placed in its tragic position com-
bining feudalism with colonialism.
Why was Confucianism unable to promote modernisation? This no doubt
involves a number of complicated historical, political, social, and economic
factors, but Confucianism’s intrinsic lack of modern values must be consid-
ered one of them. And what exactly are “modern values”? The rights of
human beings, including the rights to freedom, property, and life, as well as
the concepts of democracy and rule of law – these constitute basic mod-
ern values, and these are exactly what Confucianism lacks. The core values
of Confucianism – benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, filial piety, etc. (40) –
all relate to a person’s responsibilities and obligations, rather than to a per-
son’s rights. That is to say, Confucianism is fundamentally a theory of in-
equality – the inequality of rights to obligations. All it requires of people is
the fulfilling of their duties, a paying “upward” (to the monarch, leader,
etc.), without affirming or protecting an individual’s rights. Yet modern so-
ciety is built on the foundation of individual rights being explicitly affirmed
and protected. In addition, in terms of governance, Confucianism’s con-
cepts and methods are based on “personal rule,” and the disastrous results
of this kind of governance are still being experienced in our society to the
present day. The current social injustice, corruption, and other problems in
today’s Chinese society did not, as diagnosed by the New Left, originate in
capitalism under globalisation or multinational companies, but rather, for
the most part, in defects in the political and economic system, and that is
what has brought about problems such as the authorities not coming
under supervision or restraint and their involvement in rent-seeking behav-
iour. The government has become an economic special interest group;
power and capital conspire and officials and businessmen collude to mis-
appropriate and plunder society’s wealth, resulting in social injustice. The
lack of supervision or restraint of the authorities is in fact a manifestation
of society under “personal rule.” In this sense it can be said that the nega-
tive influence of traditional Confucian society still exists, and this influence
is incompatible with modern rule-of-law society. For this reason, whether
in terms of values or governance concepts, Confucianism must be consid-
ered incompatible with modern society, and it is therefore unreasonable to
artificially elevate Confucianism.
How to regard and evaluate the current national studies craze – this in
itself constitutes one of the points of debate in the national studies craze.
Evaluation of any matter can be carried out from any number of angles,
such as truth, virtue, fairness, legitimacy, reasonableness, etc. Compara-
tively speaking, the concept of “reasonableness” is clearly the most appro-
priate standard for evaluating the national studies craze. In order to say
whether something is reasonable or not, we need to examine its pros and
cons. In terms of a culture, “pros” include its progressiveness – whether or
not it can promote rather than hinder social progress. The reasons put for-
ward for vigorously promoting national studies are for the most part made
from the national-ethnic standpoint rather than from the standpoint of
humanity as a whole. In philosophical terms, this touches upon the rela-
tionship between “particularity” and “universality.” Just as we speak of or
regard someone on the basis of whether that person is a Shanghainese, a
Chinese, an Asian, or just a human being, we can speak of or regard a cul-
ture in the same way. We can use the “Shanghainese” angle to regard a par-
ticular person, and according to the criteria of that particular angle design
and develop that person’s distinguishing features, for instance having him
speak Shanghai dialect, learn to sing Shanghai opera, gain proficiency in
Shanghai’s history and culture, follow Shanghainese conventions in all his
actions, and become a classic Shanghainese. This is one way of training up
a person from the angle of “particularity.” No doubt some “distinctive char-
acter” will result from such training, but ultimately it will be difficult to
achieve a worthwhile result. On the other hand, we can develop him from
the angle of “universality,” which is to say, we can foster universal human
qualities, and through education and training enhance his rationality, and
breed in him a noble character that aims to serve the cause of human
progress in a spirit of internationalism. Very few people are likely to negate
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this latter form of training, because it involves enhancing a person’s uni-
versalist orientation. Likewise, there are two main forms of cultural devel-
opment: should we limit ourselves to approaching our national culture
from the angle of particularities, or use the angle of universality to en-
hance our national culture? Are those things with particular characteristics
necessarily “national essence” and invariably good? Wasn’t the foot-bind-
ing of women a distinguishing characteristic? It can be seen that things
with particular characteristics can be a matter of chance, while only the
universal is inevitable, because it constitutes the essential part of the par-
ticular. Of course, this is not to say that universality is absolute or to sep-
arate it from particularity; universality depends for its existence on the ex-
ceptional. Rather, what we emphasise is that the particular should not be
made an absolute; the particular should be elevated to the universal in
order for it to avoid, as much as possible, becoming a matter of chance.
In the course of history, each national ethnicity has formed its own par-
ticular culture. At the same time, however, these cultures have in various
degrees and to various extents risen toward universality. The more a cul-
ture approaches the quality of universality, the firmer the grasp it gains on
the inexorable law of cultural development, the more advanced that cul-
ture will become, and the farther ahead of other cultures it will advance,
even in an era that endorses cultural pluralism. This is the logic revealed in
the saying “World trends are vast and mighty; those who follow them
prosper, while those who go contrary to them perish.” The world trend is
essentially universalist; it is not something that can be transformed by a
particular aspiration. Only a culture that flows with this tide and joins or
even guides the universal culture is a vital culture. This means that a par-
ticular culture cannot limit itself to chance, but must in its specialness grab
hold of the universal, grab hold of the inevitable, in order to position itself
at the forefront of the historical trend.
Doing this requires creativity, and creativity is inseparable from discover-
ing problems. In a very real sense, discovering problems is achieved
through scepticism and criticism regarding existing learning and culture.
The ancients said, “Better to have no books than to believe them unre-
servedly,” (41) while Westerners say that existing knowledge should be
treated with “suspension of judgment”; (42) both are saying the same thing,
which is that existing thinking and knowledge should be treated with scep-
ticism and that one should avoid being influenced by it as much as possi-
ble. If we accept this point, then in terms of frame of mind, raising slogans
such as “reviving national studies” does not facilitate the cultivation of a
spirit of scepticism or criticism, nor does it facilitate the development of
thinking, learning, and culture, because the thinking behind this proposi-
tion is the very opposite of sceptical or critical, and can easily give rise to
a blind affirmation of traditional things, or even blind worship. Just think:
how can a person who from his youth has regarded the Confucian classics
as the “books of the sages” turn into a person who regards these works
with scepticism or criticism? And without the prerequisite of scepticism
and criticism, it is very hard to discover problems, as a result of which
thinking and learning become very hard to push forward.
In terms of the history of Chinese thought and learning, what is lacking
is not an affirmation of traditional culture, but on the contrary a lack of
scepticism and criticism toward it. Of course, the “scepticism and criti-
cism” referred to here is well-intentioned and meant in the sense of dis-
covering and solving problems, rather than outright negation. In terms of
Confucianism, what scholars have been thinking since ancient times – to
borrow Feng Youlan’s (43) words – is how to “follow on from it” or “carry it
forward.” Although he meant “carry it forward” in the sense of saying
something new, why can we only “follow” or “carry” rather than initiate a
new discourse and open up a new philosophy? Why, after Confucianism,
could there only be “Neo-Confucianisms” succeeding one other in each
new era? Speaking of Confucian orthodoxy and orthodox tradition and the
“orthodox school” as standard and glorious (44) makes it seem as if the only
Chinese philosophy allowed throughout the ages was Confucianism.
Heaven does not change, and neither does the Way. (45) Referring back to
the West, we see realism, apriorism, phenomenology, existentialism, ana-
lytic philosophy, structuralism, deconstructionism... and there are many
others that could be cited. By Confucian standards, which one is orthodox?
Therefore, in contrasting the experiences in thought of Eastern and West-
ern philosophy, innovation and creativity in learning and culture require
first of all scepticism and criticism, and through discovering problems and
finding new problem areas, creating new understanding and explanations
to form new thinking or even a school of thought. These should be the sci-
entific parameters of scholarly development from the outset. The Chinese
culture of the Spring and Autumn period became the most brilliant and
magnificent period in China’s intellectual history, not because it “respected
only Confucianism” but because it let “a hundred schools of thought con-
tend.” In addition, in terms of the experience of Western thought, Kant’s
philosophy has been so enduring because he pondered the question of
“what it is to be human,” and not because he was trying to carry forward
Germany’s “national studies” or the philosophical traditions of the West.
On the contrary, advances in Western philosophy have been built on the
constant criticism of its existing traditions, as revealed in the titles of
Kant’s three great “Critiques.” Kant furthermore completely negated all the
“metaphysics” that came before him, considering them “unscientific” and
requiring criticism to re-establish a “scientific metaphysics.” It is this kind
of critique that has enabled Western philosophy to continually produce
new ideas. Even the “Renaissance” was not merely a revival of Ancient
Greek and Roman culture, but rather a humanistic philosophical and cul-
tural movement – a movement of unprecedented ideological and spiritual
emancipation and creativity. It impelled a return to humanity and an em-
phasis on human dignity, both of which laid the foundation for the human
rights thought of the Enlightenment.
Scholarly criticism serves the same purpose as a doctor’s diagnosis and
treatment of a patient. If we never carry out critiques of learning and cul-
ture, how can we discover their problems and shortcomings, and how can
we push them forward? For instance, if we never critique society, how can
we know what abuses and risks exist? Discovering problems through cri-
tique, and posing theories and methods to solve these problems, is not
only theoretically creative, but also brings about progress in thinking and
society, and culture develops correspondingly.
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Chen Jiaming – The National Studies Craze
As early as 1902, Huang Zunxian (黃遵憲) (46) opposed publishing a na-
tional studies journal and opposed the promotion of national essence in
China. The reason was that he believed China’s problem was not in its in-
capacity for conservatism, but rather that “the illness is in arrogance and
adherence to the old ways.” (47) This viewpoint really hits the mark and
points to the crux of the problem. The blind self-importance and self-de-
ceit with which traditional culture is approached, and the wish to carry for-
ward Confucian tradition without knowing how to actually do so, has re-
sulted in focusing on the same old questions and topics for years on end
and never setting off on a new path. A classic example is Mou Zongsan’s (48)
“new inner sageliness and new outer kingliness,” which strives to open a
path for so-called “science” and “democracy” through the old traditional
Confucian proposition of “inner sageliness and outer kingliness.” In fact,
the crux of the problems we face nowadays is no longer the theoretical or
practical possibility of science and democracy, but rather how to effec-
tively develop science, and how to implement genuine democracy and
deal with the shortcomings that have already been discovered in the dem-
ocratic system. Mou Zongsan’s strenuous expounding and proving of the
new inner sageliness and new outer kingliness therefore results in nothing
so much as the impression of “scratching one’s foot through a boot.”
One phenomenon worth pondering is the modern fate of the world’s
“four great ancient civilisations” – ancient China, ancient India, ancient
Egypt, and ancient Babylon (in fact, “ancient Greece” should also be added
to make five great ancient civilisations). Did their status as the launch pads
of civilisation and their long-standing and glorious traditions result in their
remaining at the forefront of all the world’s nations? In fact, the opposite
is true. Compared with modern developed countries, every one of these is
still considered a developing country – and indeed, Babylon has long
ceased to exist as a country. Their glory belongs to the past, but history is
changing. If tradition is not handled properly, it can become a heavy bur-
den and an obstacle to accepting new thinking, new things, and new cul-
ture.
In the present national studies craze, what is particularly absurd is Con-
fucian fundamentalism. Based on the absurd premise that “modern China
has already ‘turned to the ways of the barbarians’ and been reduced to a
colony of Western civilisation,” it attempts to draw an equally absurd con-
clusion by offering “Confucianism to solve all of China’s problems,” includ-
ing political, social, and livelihood problems. All fundamentalist religions
have their similarities. For example, the Islamic fundamentalism repre-
sented by Khomeini in Iran advocates returning to the Koran.
The arguments of Confucian fundamentalism give me the impression of
being full of religious fervour and taking no account of the realities of
China. For this reason, it is impossible for it to succeed, but as an extremist
ideology, it should keep us on the alert. The reason that Confucian funda-
mentalism cannot succeed is that it violates historical logic and does not
realise that history cannot go backwards, and therefore is fated to be as
short-lived as Yuan Shikai’s attempt to restore the monarchy. Confucianism
was originally a ruling ideology, but history has forsaken it because it was
unable to establish a reasonable system. Yet Confucian fundamentalism’s
advocacy of a “wholesale revival” of Confucianism as a consummate pat-
tern for religion and politics has as its guiding principle a wholesale return
to the past and advocacy of uniting politics and religion. In the contempo-
rary world, the only places still uniting church and state are the Vatican,
Iran, and a handful of other theocracies. After comparing the virtues and
shortcomings of these countries with those of democratic countries, no
more need be said. If, in accordance with the aforementioned guiding prin-
ciple of Confucian fundamentalism, a religious form of Confucianism really
became the foundation of the country’s legitimacy, the result would be a
reversion to rule under a mixture of theocracy and feudalism; democracy,
freedom, and social justice would be reduced to nothing more than a
dream, and the series of urgent problems that China currently faces, such
as corruption and social injustice, would be hard to eradicate. The scope of
China’s actual changes and the complexity of its situation make simply re-
sorting to traditional Confucian culture all the more unfeasible. The “Con-
fucian socialism” that the New Left and Neo-Confucians have jointly pro-
posed puts “human sentiment and affection for homeland” in the same
category as freedom and equality, and through clumsy wordplay changes
the People’s Republic of China into a “Confucian Socialist Republic,” then
goes on to assert that “the most profound significance of China’s reforms
is to unearth the profound implications of ‘Confucian socialism,’” which it
claims will be the “greatest task of China in the twenty-first century.” (49)
This thesis is as untenable as the other pronouncements the New Left has
come up with (for example, attributing China’s problems to the problems
of globalised capitalism, holding that China’s corruption and injustice arise
from globalisation and multinational companies). At China’s present stage,
in which we continue to say that “democracy is a good thing,” if the afore-
mentioned bizarre notions of Confucian fundamentalists can gain traction,
and the alliance of the New Left with Confucianists can be applauded, all
that indicates is that China’s intellectual enlightenment remains inade-
quate, that China’s social realities are not yet sufficiently recognised, and
that more effort needs to be devoted to this aspect.
❚ Translated by Stacy Mosher
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46. TN: Aka Huang Tsun-hsien (1848-1905), a writer and diplomat.
47. Quoted from Zhu Weizheng, “Guoxue Dawen,” op. cit., p. 9.
48. TN: The Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan was also influenced by Kant and Buddhism.
49. Gan Yang, “Zhongguo daolu: Sanshi nian yu liushi nian” (China’s road: 30 years and 60 years), 26 June
2007, http://www. 360doc.com/content/07/0702/00/24133_589534.shtml.
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